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Credit rating agencies are said to be among those who caused the financial crisis. Both the
United States and Europe have passed numerous laws intended to monitor them more closely.
It stands undisputed, however, that these regulations do not suffice to solve the problems that
evolved in the financial crisis. This article evaluates the European Commission’s latest Credit
Rating Agencies Regulation, which introduces, among others, two mandatory rating, sets a
time limit on the contractual relationship between Rating Agency and the contracting entity
and a civil liability regime. In order to effectively enforce the affected rights, two additional
means must be introduced: Mandating a European rating could break the market’s oligopo-
listic structure and help jump-start small European agencies. A civil liability regime can only
serve as an incentive to introducing self-control if liability rules are truly deterring: To ensure
that wrong ratings (such as Lehman Brothers’) will actually lead to enforceable damage
claims, the new Regulation needs to introduce a reversal of the burden of proof. This includes
requiring the agency to immediately adjust a rating, avoiding an issuer’s premature down-
scaling, and introducing a “rating out-look”. In the article, several recent cases will be
reviewed to assess the practicability of the new liability regime.
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I. Introduction
Credit rating agencies are faced with harsh winds these days; the European
lawmaker’s efforts to regulate them advance and include the discussion
whether a liability regime should be introduced. For the first time, companies
question the market’s oligopolistic structure and fierily criticize the ratings’
pricing.1 Even among credit rating agencies, disagreements exist, as was seen
when Fitch attacked its competitor Standard & Poor’s (S&P) for what it
believed to be too positive ratings.2 Headlines on rating mishaps3, controver-
sial down-ratings of creditability4 and a number of law suits5 against credit
rating agencies further fueled the discussion on regulating credit rating agen-
cies. This article will first explain the former legal framework (II.) and what
regulating efforts have been undertaken thus far (III.). It will then show which
gaps exist in regulation and focus, in particular, on the intended introduction
of a liability regime (IV).
1. Legal Framework before 2009
Over many years, European law did not know a comprehensive provision to
monitor credit rating agencies. The system was based on the principle of self-
1 N.N., Deutsche Großkonzerne wehren sich gegen Preiserhöhungen von S&P, Reuters,
April 23, 2012, available at http://de.reuters.com/article/economicsNews/idDEBEE
83M09R20120423.
2 Shenn, Fitch again blasts S&P grades on Credit Suisse mortage debt, December 3, 2012,
available at www.bloomberg.com.
3 Gatinois/Lacombe/Michel, Le jour où la France a perdu son <<AAA>>. . .par erreur,
November 12, 2011, Le Monde.
4 N.N., US loses AAA credit rating after S&P downgrade, BBC News, August 6, 2011,
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-14428930.
5 N.N., Credit Rating Agencies settle 2 suits brought by investors, The New York Times,
April 28, 2013, p. A4; Eaglesham/Neumann/Perez, U.S sues S&P over Ratings, Wall
Street Journal, February 5, 2013, available at www.wsj.com; Gullo, S&P, Moody’s, Fitch
Lose Bid to Toss Calpers Lawsuit Claiming Negligence, Bloomberg, May 4, 2010, avail-
able at www.bloomberg.com; N.N.,Klage gegen Ratingagentur zugelassen, Handelsblatt,
November 28, 2011, available at http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/banken/
nach-lehman-pleite-klage-gegen-ratingagentur-zugelassen/5895788.html.
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regulation according to the IOSCO Code6 rules and on a recognition proce-
dure as laid out in the Capital Requirements Directive.7 Even though the U.S.
has had an authorization procedure for credit rating agencies since 1975, the
European Union considered the existing standards as sufficient:8 It argued,
inter alia, that additional authorization is not necessary as credit rating agen-
cies depend on their reputation alone. An authorization procedure would
isolate the market and make governments partly liable for published ratings.9
There are three elementary instruments which ensure the capital market’s
functioning: Avoiding conflicts of interest, information requirements, and
surveillance.10 These instruments have not been developed sufficiently when
dealing with credit rating agencies.
a. Conflicts of Interest
Since the 1970s, the “issuer pays”-model has been applied, requiring the issuer
to pay for a rating’s preparation.11 This model typically leads to a conflict of
interests on part of the rating agency (“solicited rating”).12 When choosing an
agency, companies thrive to be awarded the highest possible credit quality.
Fitch’s public criticism that S&P allegedly rated too positively showed that
6 Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies of the IOSCO (Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions), available at http://www.eesc.euro
pa.eu/self-and-coregulation/documents/codes/private/065-private-act.pdf, last down-
load 7. 3. 2014.
7 Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006
relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast),
O.J. No. L 177, 1, and Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit insti-
tutions (recast), O.J. No. L 177, 201.
8 See Communication from the Commission on Credit Rating Agencies, March 11, 2006,
O.J. No. C 59, 2, 6: “Following the request by the European Parliament, the Commis-
sion has considered very carefully whether or not fresh legislative proposals are required
to regulate the activities of credit rating agencies. Its conclusion is that at present no new
legislative initiatives are needed.”
9 On the argument, see e.g. Partnoy, 77 Wash.U.L.Q. (1999), 619, 627; Schwarcz, 1 U.Ill.-
L.Rev. (2002), 1; Fleischer, Gutachten F 64. DJT, 2002, F 134.
10 Möllers, 4 C.M.L.J. 477 et seq. (2009); Möllers, JZ 2009, 861 et seq.
11 Ellis/Fairchild/D’Souza, 7 VA.LBus.Rev(2013) 1, 2; Cinquegrana, The Reform of the
Credit Rating Agencies: A Comparative Perspective, ECMI Policy No. 12/February
2009, 2.2.
12 On the distinction between solicited and unsolicited rating, see Fulghieri/Srobl/Xia The
Economics of Solicited and Unsolicited Credit Ratings, p. 1, available at http://papers.
ssrn.com; for further information on conflict of interests see Darcy, Credit Rating
Agencies and the Credit Crisis: How the “Issuer Pays” Conflict Contributed and What
Regulators Might Do About It, 2009 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 605.
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these fears are real.13 To further exacerbate the problem, prior to a rating, many
companies are advised on how a financial product needs to be structured for it
to reach the highest rating. So-called structured financial products such as
collateralized debt obligations (CDO) proved especially disastrous in the
course of the financial crisis. Though they are more dangerous and contain a
higher risk than other products, they received best grades for reliability.14
b. Missing Information
The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis15 is the basis for informational
duties. According to this hypothesis, all public information is “fed into” the
market as soon as it becomes available to the investors.16 Research on behav-
ioral finance shows that a “homo oeconomicus” who rationally processes
information is a rare ideal: Stock exchanges overreact wave-like since they
reflect their participants’ emotion-driven behavior.17
The financial crisis showed that the information used by agencies and, conse-
quently, theratingsthemselvesarenottrustworthy:Subprimeproductsreceived
good grades, clearly under-rating their large risks. In addition, credit rating
agencies failed to immediately adjust ratings to worsening market conditions.18
13 Though asked to evaluate the transaction, Fitch was denied the rating order “due to the
agency’s more conservative credit stance”, see Shenn, Fitch blasts S&P grades on Credit
Suisse mortage debt, Mar. 30, 2012, www.bloomberg.com.
14 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Final Report of the National Commission on the
Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, 2011, p. 127, available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf, last download
7. 3. 2014.
15 On the information deficit at the capital market and the Efficient Capital Markets
Hypothesis (ECMH), see Fama, 25 J.Fin. (1970), 83; Fama, 46 J.Fin. (1991), 1575,
1576; Fischel, 74 Cornell. L. Rev. (1989), 907; Brealey/Myers, Principles of Corporate
Finance, 7th ed., Boston 2003, pp. 347 et seqq.; Elton/Gruber/Brown/Goetzmann,
Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment, 6th ed. 2003, pp. 402 et seqq.
16 Fischel, 74 Cornell. L. Rev. (1989), 907.
17 Such as a lemming-like behavior, blindly complying with a finance guru’s recommen-
dations. On behavioral finance in general, see e.g. Thaler, Advances in Behavioral Fi-
nances Vol. I, Princeton 1993; Thaler, Advances in Behavioral Finances Vol. II, 2005;
Goldberg/von Nitzsch, Behavioral Finance, 4th ed. 2004; Fleischer, Behavioral Law and
Economics im Gesellschafts- und Kapitalmarktrecht — ein Werkstattbericht, in: Fuchs/
Schwintowski/Zimmer (eds.), Wirtschafts- und Privatrecht im Spannungsfeld von Pri-
vatautonomie, Wettbewerb und Regulierung. Festschrift für Ulrich Immenga zum
70. Geburtstag, Munich 2004, pp. 575 et seqq.
18 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on Credit Rating
Agencies, November 12, 2008, COM (2008) 704 final, 2; in depth Möllers, JZ 2009, 861
et seqq.
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c. The Rating Market’s Oligopolitistic Structure
The world-wide market for credit ratings is still dominated by the three agen-
cies S&P, Moody’s and Fitch.19 One reason for this market structure is the fact
that companies choose credit rating agencies according to their reputation. A
rating’s reliability is measured by a long and well-documented history, the so-
called track record. It shows whether an agency has delivered sufficiently good
estimates in its ratings over a longer period of time.20 The rating market’s
oligopolistic structure creates dependencies and, at the same time, market
access barriers21 for small and medium-sized credit rating agencies trying to
establish themselves.
2. European Regulation Efforts in the Context of the Financial Crisis
a. Credit Rating Regulations No. 1060/200922 and No. 426/201323
When the subprime bubble burst, the European financial market policy had to
be reconsidered. The credit rating agencies’ failure is best corrected “by meas-
ures relating to conflicts of interest, the quality of the credit ratings, the trans-
parency and [. . .] surveillance of the activities of the credit rating agencies”24.
By introducing the Credit Rating Regulation 1060/2009 in November 2009,
the European Union rejected the principle of self-regulation.25 The core of the
Credit Rating Regulation is the requirement of registration in Art. 14 Credit
Rating Regulation and the registration procedure.
19 Together, S&P and Moody’s have a market share of 80%, the British credit rating
agency Fitch is attributed further 15%; see Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82
Wash.U.L.Q. 43, 59 et seq. (2004); Blaurock, ZGR 2007, 603, 606.
20 Zentraler Kreditausschuss, Stellungnahme zur Tätigkeit von Rating-Agenturen und ihrer
möglichen Regulierung, August 14, 2003, p. 5, available at http://www.zka-online.de/
uploads/media/030815_ZKAStn_Rating-Agenturen.pdf, last download March 10,
2014. Only market niches remain for new providers; Strunz-Happe, WM 2004, 115, 120.
21 See Lerch, BKR 2010, 402, 403; Thörle, BLJ 2011, 14.
22 Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 ofthe European Parliament and of the Council of 16
September 2009, O.J. No. L 302, 1 (Credit Rating Regulation); Möllers, JZ 2009, 861,
870; Möllers, NZG 2010, 285, 288.
23 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 426/2013 of 8 May 2013 adapting Regulations (EC)
No. 1120/2009, (EC) No. 1121/2009 and (EC) No. 1122/2009 as regards implementing
rules for direct payment in Croatia.
24 Recital 10 Credit Rating Regulation (Fn. 22).
25 Deipenbrock, RIW 2010, 612, 613.
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Regulation 1060/2009 was amended in 2013 by a Regulation and a Directive.
The amending regulation 462/2013 addresses issues which have been not
solved sufficiently by the first regulation or were left unregulated. The most
significant innovation of this Regulation is the introduction of a civil liability
regime.
b. ESMA Regulations
A clear mandate and a new structure to improve the effectiveness of surveil-
lance had already been demanded in the Larosière Report26 in 2009. Since
national authorities were still charged with materially examining the require-
ments for admittance as well as with regulatory tasks, the CESR was only
engaged in case of conflict among the competent authorities.27 Thus, organiza-
tional need for coordination was significant.28 In the course of the ESMA
Regulation29, the ESMA (European Securities and Markets Authority) suc-
ceeded the CESR beginning January 1, 2011. The Amending Regulation30
transferred the exclusive competence to register and monitor credit rating
agencies to ESMA.31 Thus the scope of competence of ESMA is finally defined
as having the general competence in the field of rating agencies thus introduc-
ing a centralized European competence.32
II. Overview of the Present Legislation
1. Avoiding Conflicts of Interest
Art. 6 and 7 Credit Rating Regulation contain rules on how to deal with
conflicts of interest and give general objectives such as avoiding that the credit
26 Larosière Group, Report on Financial Supervision in the EU of February 25, 2009, pp. 46
et seqq., http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_-
de.pdf.
27 Art. 24 Para. 3 Subpara. 2 Credit Rating Agency (Fn. 22).
28 See in detail Möllers, JZ 2009, 861, 870; Möllers, NZG 2010, 285, 288.
29 Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 No-
vember 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and
Markets Authority) amending Decision No. 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission
Decision 2009/77/EC, O.J. No. L 331, 84 (ESMA Regulation).
30 Regulation (EU) No. 513/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May
2011 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies (Amending
Regulation), O.J. No. L 145, 30.
31 Art. 14 8 c Amending Regulation (Fn. 30).
32 Regulation 513/2011/EU Recital 5.
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rating agency’s business relations influence the rating. Annex I to the Credit
Rating Regulation specifies these provisions in an organizational (Section A),
operational (Section B) and personal (Section C) way. These rules have been
amended by the new regulation adding an art. 6 a, which deals with conflicts of
interest concerning investments in credit rating agencies. Its aim is to avoid
conflicts of interest arising from members or shareholders of credit rating
agencies investing in another agency.
a. Advisory Services
Previous advisory services by credit rating agencies create a large potential for
conflicts of interest if the agency shapes the issuer’s financial products with the
highest possible credit quality rating in mind. The Credit Rating Regulation
addresses this problem and prohibits such advisory services for the company
to be rated.33 Side services such as “market forecasts, estimates of economic
trends, pricing analysis and other general data analysis” are explicitly admitted
but must be disclosed in the credit rating agency’s final report.34
Conflicts of interest also arise from long-lasting contractual relationships
between credit rating agencies and rated entities, leading to too much famil-
iarity and loss of objectiveness.35 Art. 6 b defines a maximum duration for
these contracts ranging from two to four years depending on the product
rated.
b. “Issuer pays” Model
The Regulation, however, does not address the “issuer pays”-model as the
main source of conflict of interests.36 In this respect, the new provision fails
to prevent these conflicts but solely reduces them. It would therefore be
beneficial if a new category of unsolicited ratings evolved with these ratings
being available to and for sale for other market participants. Thus far, a market
for unsolicited ratings exists mostly for follow-up ratings. Competition ap-
33 Annex I Section B 4 No. 2, Annex I Section E II 2 a, Annex I Section E I 2 Credit Rating
Regulation (Fn. 22).
34 Annex I Section B § 2 and 3 Credit Rating Regulation (Fn. 22).
35 Regulation Commission Regulation (EU) No. 426/2013 of 8 May 2013 adapting Reg-
ulations (EC) No. 1120/2009, (EC) No. 1121/2009 and (EC) No. 1122/2009 as regards
implementing rules for direct payment in Croatia, Recital 12.
36 Doubtful to the fact that the issuer-pays model generates conflicts of interest to a great
extent: Partnoy, Law and Economic Research Paper No. 14, USD 08/27/01.
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pears to increase, though. The Egan-Jones Rating Company37, for instance, no
longer offers solicited ratings but advertises that it is not subject to conflicts of
interest. Alternatively, surveillance authorities could commission credit rating
agencies to prepare a credit rating. Such commissioning is, for example, known
in capital markets law when an auditor scrutinizes a securities company. Here,
BaFin charges the auditor with examining whether a securities service com-
pany complies with its informatory and advisory duties.38 In the U.S., too,
involving an intermediary was discussed.39 The SEC requested a feasibility
study, the results of which were published in December 2012.40
In late 2011, ESMA presented a draft for regulatory technical standards41,
intended to further improve the registration procedure’s transparency and
ongoing rating activities. Due to the new Regulation in 2013, the final version
was delayed.42 ESMA discusses in detail whether the “issuer pays” model
should be eliminated.43 The EU Commission’s proposal for a new regulation,
however, adheres to this model despite admitting that conflicts of interests
exist.44
37 Selfstatement on the website: “Egan-Jones Ratings is an independent ratings firm and not
paid by corporations issuing bonds.” (http://www.egan-jones.com); Grant, Egan-Jones
approved by new SEC-Register, Financial Times 15. 1. 2008, available at http://www.ft.
com/cms/s/0/0c2342b0-c2f1-11dc-b617-0000779fd2ac.html, last download 7. 3. 2014.
Their business allegedly grew by 30% from 2007 to 2009, but had to face a severe set-back
when being banned from rating sovereign ABS for 18 month in January 2013, http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-22/egan-jones-faces-18-month-ban-on-sover-
eign-asset-backed-ratings.html, last download 7. 3. 2014.
38 Möllers, ZJS 2009, 227, 231.
39 Bächstädt, KRP 4/2010, p. 24, available at http://www.ratingrisk.de/Baechstaedt_Fin_
Ratingagenturen.PDF, last download 7. 3. 2014; Proposal by Senator Franken, available
at http://www.dsnews.com/articles/sen-franken-and-others-address-rating-agency-re
form-2011-09-01, last download 7. 3. 2014.
40 Securization Update by Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, Jan. 2012, p. 8, available
at http://www.kramerlevin.com/files/Publication/706e8e86-d4a2-4b69-8665-0b0bbbb
3c9f5/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/cf152c29-0b87-4dd6-840c-0f0fa0f94073/
Securitization%20Update%20January%202012.pdf, last download 7. 3. 2014.
41 ESMA, Final Report, Regulatory Technical Standards on the presentation of the infor-
mation that credit rating agencies shall disclose in accordance with Article 11(2) and
point 1 of Part II of Section E of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009, ESMA/
2011/461, 22 December 2011, available at http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/
2011_461.pdf, last download 7. 3. 2014.
42 Discussion Paper 20113/891, http://www.esma.europa.eu/news/ESMA-launches-con
sultation-implementation-new-CRA-Regulation.
43 Bremer, NZG 2011, 1181.
44 The “issuer pays”-model Regulation (EU) No. 462/2013 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 21 May 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 on credit
rating agencies, Recital 10.
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2. Transparency and duties of disclosure
In addition to the rules intended to prevent conflicts of interest, credit rating
agencies are faced with comprehensive duties of information and disclosure
according to the Credit Rating Regulation.45 Artt. 8 and 10 Credit Rating
Regulation, as well as art. 11, read in conjunction with Annex I Section E,
specify the duties of disclosure with regard to methods, models and general
assumptions upon which the credit ratings are based. Additionally, agencies
are required to report their rating category’s historic default rate every six
months.46 Furthermore, credit rating agencies are required to publish a yearly
transparency report which includes, inter alia, internal control mechanisms to
ensure quality, method and model evaluations and the analysts’ rotation pol-
icies.47
3. Mandatory second rating
The newly introduced art. 8 c requires two ratings for structured finance in-
struments. The aim is to ensure the rating’s quality and minimize dependence.
When engaging two credit rating agencies, the issuers shall consider to engage
one agency that has less than 10% of the total market share, art. 8 d Para 1. The
regulation does not contain an obligation for a rating by a “small” credit rating
company, because the issuer is free to decide against a rating by a small com-
pany. A negative decision only has to be documented, art. 8 d Para 1.
To this day, ESMA registered 37 credit rating agencies.48 On paper, therefore,
interested parties can choose from many credit rating agencies. Despite these
numbers, though, 95% of the rating market is dominated by S&P, Moody’s
and Fitch. The new regulations are a first step to break the oligopoly but only
time will show if issuers indeed appoint a smaller credit rating agency for a
second rating. Smaller agencies could benefit from this regulation especially if
the costs for ratings were lower. An obligatory second rating is an immense
cost factor that issuers will try to keep as small as possible. Investors’ percep-
tion of the second rating also needs to be factored in, as it is unclear whether
they will be influenced by it or not.
45 In depth, Haar, ZBB 2010, 185, 188 et seqq.
46 Regulation No. 1060/2009 Annex I Sec. E II No. 1 (fn. 22).
47 Regulation No. 1060/2009 Art. 12 in conjunction with Annex I Section E Part III No. 2
and 3 (fn. 22).
48 List of registered and certified CRAs, February 6, 2012, available at http://www.esma.
europa.eu.
ECFR 3/2014 Regulation and Liability of Credit Rating Agencies 341
4. Other de lege ferenda proposals: Making financial market participants
more independent of agencies’ credit ratings
a. Obligation to prove a European rating
The current regulation still is far from satisfactory as small credit rating agen-
cies only have to be taken into consideration where a second rating is man-
datory.49 It remains to be seen whether this leads to a significant increase in
ratings by these agencies. This regulation also fails to put a stronger empha-
sizes on a European perspective. Requiring a second mandatory rating to be
European could strengthen European agencies and lead to more independence
from the three big U.S. rating companies.
Considering the rating agencies currently admitted by ESMA, a European
credit rating agency would need to be defined in detail. S&P is currently
represented in the EU by three of its daughters, Moody’s by six and Fitch
by seven of its own. Thus, more than half of all credit rating agencies with an
ESMA authorization are European subsidiaries of the “great three”.50 De-
manding an additional rating by an ESMA-authorized agency is therefore
not satisfactory if not combined with other measures. In India, for instance,
the rating market is dominated by three agencies which are mostly unknown
here, namely, CRISIL, CARE and ICRA.51 A look at the shareholders shows,
however, that Moody’s holds 29% of ICRA. S&P even owns the majority of
CRISIL shares, 52%.52 These numbers are significant proof for the American
agencies’ influence on the Indian rating market.
The proposal for one mandatory genuinely European rating does not consti-
tute a breach of the General Agreement on Trades and Services (GATS)53.
Credit rating as financial service is explicitly included in the GATS’ scope of
application, cf. § 1 (a) (xvi) of the annex.54 According to art. XVI § 1 GATS,
GATS member states are required to allow access to their service markets to
foreign companies in that the other member states’ service providers must
receive a treatment that is no less favorable than that agreed upon.55 For
49 See above II 3.
50 See List of registered and certified CRAs, January 6, 2012.
51 N.N., Letters from India, The Economist, March 17, 2012, p. 68.
52 N.N., Letters from India, The Economist, March 17, 2012, p. 68; CARE, on the other
hand, is mainly held by Indian banks: IDBI Bank Ltd. (26%), Canara Bank (23%) and
State Bank of India (9%), http://www.careratings.com/AboutCARERatings/Sharehol
ders.aspx.
53 BGBl. II, 1994, 1643 et seqq.
54 BGBl. II, 1994, 1660 et seqq.
55 See in detail Vahldiek, BKR 2003, 971 et seqq.
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Germany, that is the list of obligations of EU member states.56 By creating a
second, mandatorily European rating, market access for other providers
would not change. Non-European agencies could still access the European
market since a “free” rating by established credit rating agencies remains
possible. The credit rating market would simply be enlarged for European
agencies. Furthermore, the GATS does not prohibit all measures which may
have a deterring effect on foreign providers: “Notwithstanding any other
provisions of the Agreement, a Member shall not be prevented from taking
measures for prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors [. . .]
or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system.”57
Admittedly, even such laws cannot prevent the Great Three’s increasing their
presence on the European market, e.g. by buying out smaller agencies. How-
ever, it is not the goal of the regulation to exclude S&P, Moody’s and Fitch
from the European Market. Instead, the rating market should be opened to
European agencies and competition should be promoted in order to give a fair
chance to these agencies. Requiring proof of a European rating could open
doors in this context. Another positive effect of this proposal is that the
creation of a “one and only” European credit rating agency is no longer
necessary: the credit rating’s independence would be ensured by competition
among the European agencies, at the same time creating a counterweight for
ratings which allegedly favor the U.S.58.
b. Reducing links to the law
aa. CRD-IV Directive – Basel III
Credit rating agencies became more important for European law of bank
regulation when the Basel II Capital Requirements Directives59 were imple-
mented.60 The Basel accord intended to ensure that the capital requirements
56 Bekanntmachung des Fünften Protokolls zum Allgemeinen Übereinkommen über den
Handel mit Dienstleistungen (=Official statement of the fifth protocol on the general
convention on trade with services), BGBl. II, 1999, 312 et seqq.; BGBl. II, 1994, 1521 et
seqq.
57 So-called “prudential carve-out”, no. 2 a) of the attachment on financial services, BGBl.
II, 1994, 1660.
58 See the thorough study by Fuchs/Gering, The Home Bias in Sovereign Ratings, Dis-
cussion Paper Series/University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, No. 552,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2370374, last down-
load 7. 3. 2014.
59 Directive 2006/48/EC of 14 June 2006, O.J. No. L 177, 1 and Directive 2006/49/EC of
14 June 2006, O.J. No. L 177, 201.
60 Haar, ZBB 2010, 185, 193; see, e.g. Art. 80 1. Directive 2006/48/EC: “Credit Quality
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take greater account of risks. The evaluation of risks is based on internal or
external ratings which help to estimate the default probability for credit am-
ortization.61 Thus, a credit institution’s minimum capitalization depends on its
debtors’ solvency. In Germany, such credit ratings may only be performed by
authorized credit rating agencies.62
Such legal references made supervision authorities dependent on ratings per-
formed by non-governmental institutions, leading to asymmetric market
mechanisms.63 This problem has since been recognized and the lawmaker
reacted to reduce the legal recourse to a credit rating agency’s assessment.
The Basel III Accord provides that both ratings and other quality or quantity
criteria determine if means can be charged as assets. Among those suitable
criteria are, inter alia, size, bid-ask spread and turnover. As these criteria
become more robust, they should become more important and external ratings
should lose some of their importance.64 Offering further parameters to esti-
mate solvency can help prevent excessive trust in external ratings alone.
The EU implemented these changes in 2013 in a Directive that substitutes the
former Capital Requirements Directives (2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC). The
member states have to implement the new Directive by 2016.65 The package
consists of a regulation on the activity of credit institutions and investment
firms and a directive governing the access to deposit-taking activities and is
intended to strengthen the European banking sector.66 Inter alia, banks will no
longer be able to base their investment decisions on external ratings, but must
also make their own, internal solvency evaluation.67 Furthermore, if a signifi-
cant number of positions in a portfolio remain open, an internal rating for this
portfolio must be created. These measures aim at reducing the importance of
may be determined by reference to the credit assessments of External Credit Assessment
Institutions [. . .].”
61 See Becker, DB 2010, 941, 943.
62 Sec. 41, 52 et seq. Solvabilitätsverordnung – SolvV (= Regulation governing the capital
adequacy of institutions, groups of institutions and financial holding groups)
(14. 12. 2006), last amended by art. 6 Regulation of 20 September 2013 (BGBl. I, 2013,
3672).
63 Lerch, BKR 2010, 402; Siekmann, Verw 43, 95, 105; Deipenbrock, WM 2005, 266 et
seqq.; Deipenbrock, WM 2006, 2237 et seq.
64 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: International framework for
liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring, December 2010, p. 11, available
at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf, last download 7. 3. 2014.
65 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013
on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit
institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Di-
rectives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC.
66 Art. 9 Directive 2013/36/EU.
67 Art. 76 § 2, art. 77 § 2 Directive 2013/36/EU.
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external ratings for credit institutions.68 On the one hand, institutions are to be
attracted to creating their own evaluation systems. On the other hand, stand-
ardized approaches remain that are based on external ratings. Mainly, financial
institutions are to be led to a point at which they do not blindly trust external
ratings but make their own judgments with the help of internal evaluations.69
This reduces dependency on external ratings without eliminating the Basel II
Accord’s principle 70 since the requirement of own funds should still be based
on external ratings to a “necessary extend”.71
bb. Solvency II
When solvency rules72 were introduced, ratings became more important to the
European insurance market as well. Capital requirements for insurance com-
panies are to be developed into a risk-oriented system of financial supervision
and the insurers’ internal risk management is to be improved.73 Here, too,
determining the probability of default lies at the center. Solvency II leaves it
up to the businesses to choose a method for measuring risk. Internal and external
evaluation models can be used if they are officially recognized. In 2010, 289 of
2520 European insurance companies confirmed working on implementing an
internal model; 262 undertakings were already using such model.74 Currently,
about one third of life and health insurances and a quarter of indemnity and
accident insurers in Germany use BaFin-authorized internal models.75
The credit rating agencies’ regulatory dependency in the insurance field is not
induced by the legal framework. It is obvious, however, that only large inter-
national insurance companies have such models.76 Mostly small and midsized
68 Recital 70, 71, 72 Directive 2013/36/EU.
69 Recital 72 Directive 2013/36/EU.
70 see e.g. Recital 70 Directive 2013/36/EU.
71 Recital 70 Directive 2013/36/EU.
72 Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November
2009 on the Taking-Up and Pursuit of the Business of Insurance and Reinsurance
(Solvency II), O.J. No. L 335, 1.
73 see e.g. Recital 102 and Chapter VI Section 4 Directive 2009/138/EC.
74 EIOPA Report on the fifth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS5) for Solvency II, EIOPA-
TFQIS5-11/001, 14. 3. 2011, p. 106, available at https://eiopa.europa.eu/publications/
reports/index.html.
75 BaFin – Ergebnisse der fünften quantitativen Auswirkungsstudie zu Solvency II (QIS 5
results for Germany), p. 22, available at http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentli
chungen/DE/Berichte/be_100716_qis5_va.html,.
76 Kaserer, Solvency II und Basel III, Die Reform der europäischen Versicherungs- und
Bankenregulierung und deren Auswirkungen auf die Unternehmensfinanzierung, June
2011, p. 16, available at http://www.fpmi.de/tl_files/fpmi/downloads/de/Gutachten_
im_Auftrag_der_fpmi.pdf.
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service providers will fall back on external ratings.77 Both Solvency II and
Basel III promote using internal risk-analyzing models to reduce dependency
on external ratings. It is to be feared, however, that credit institutions will have
problems similar to those of insurance companies where internal ratings are
concerned.
III. Liability
1. The new liability regime of art. 35 a of the rating regulation
The most important innovation of the new regulation is the introduction of a
civil liability regime. Art. 35 a reads:
“1. Where a credit rating agency has committed, intentionally or with gross negligence, any of the
infringements listed in Annex III having an impact on a credit rating, an investor or issuer may
claim damages from that credit rating agency for damage caused to it due to that infringement.
“An investor may claim damages under this Article where it establishes that it has reasonably
relied, in accordance with Article 5 a (1) or otherwise with due care, on a credit rating for a decision
to invest into, hold onto or divest from a financial instrument covered by that credit rating.
“An issuer may claim damages under this Article where it establishes that it or its financial instru-
ments are covered by that credit rating and the infringement was not caused by misleading and
inaccurate information provided by the issuer to the credit rating agency, directly or through
information publicly available. [. . .]”
It grants the investor a right of redress when relying on a rating issued in
breach of Regulation 1060/2009. Also, issuers who suffered damages caused
by a breach of the same regulation are compensated. The possibility of claim-
ing damages is available for both groups regardless of any contractual relation-
ships between the parties.
a. Breach of Duty
Liability requires a breach of one of the duties listed in Annex III of the regu-
lationandthat thisbreachhashadanimpactonthecredit rating.Anextensive list
of duties was added to Annex III to Regulation No. 1060/2009. Among others,
an infringement constitutes liability if conflicts of interest exist because of per-
sonal involvement as defined by the Regulation or if rotation duties are not
fulfilled.78 Furthermore, credit rating agencies are liable if they do not appro-
77 Arneth/Sauka, Kreditwesen 2008, 796, 799, available at http://www.meag.com/reddot/
downloads/de/Solvency_II.pdf.
78 Regulation 1060/2009/EU, Annex III no. I 19 to 21, 33, 26a–b, 38–40.
ECFR 3/2014Thomas M.J. Möllers and Charis Niedorf346
priately ensure that ratings are based on a thorough analysis of all available
information. Methods and ratings must continuously be monitored.79 Another
way to become liable is to breach the extensive duties of disclosure toward
ESMA and the public.80
b. Reliance
Investors can only claim damages if their investment decision was based on the
rating and if such reliance was legally admissible. Investors have to prove that
they exercised due care when relying on the rating. This poses an immense
restriction on liability. According to art. 5 a, all entities listed in art. 4 (1) have
to make their own risk assessments and may not solely or automatically rely
on other credit ratings. These entities include all institutional investors. In-
stitutional investors are the group most likely to claim damages against credit
rating agencies. Since art. 5 a requires them to make their own assessments, it is
virtually impossible for them to claim that they still relied on the (outside)
rating to an extend that justifies a damage claim: If both forecasts are identical,
the investor does not rely solely on the credit agency’s rating. If the investor’s
assessment differs from the agency’s rating, no investor who trusts his own
assessment will instead rely on that of the agency as such reliance would imply
that he did not sufficiently fulfill his duties laid out in art. 4 (1). At the very
least, an investor exercising due care cannot rely on a credit agency’s rating if
he has reason to believe that this rating is wrong. Such reason exists if other
assessments (i.e. his own) differ from the agency’s rating.
The requirement for reliance was not a part of the Commission’s initial pro-
posal.81 The consequences of this requirement deeply affect the liability re-
gime. This provision in practice restricts liability claims to private investors,
which was not initially intended by the legislature. A liability claim by those
most likely to sue is thus practically prevented.
Private investors do not have an obligation for an own risk assessment thus
may rely generally on ratings. This reliance is restricted by the requirement of
reasonableness. Consequently a private investor would have to prove that he
reasonably relied on the rating alone. This is very difficult in cases where there
is media coverage that opposes or confirms the rating. In other words, it is
virtually impossible to prove specific causation of the rating for the investment
decision.
79 Regulation 1060/2009/EU, Annex III no. I 42, 46, 46 a.
80 Regulation 1060/2009/EU, Annex III no. II 3 a, 3 b, 4 a.
81 Com (2011) 747.
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c. Burden of proof
The regulation on the burden of proof is the drawback of the whole liability
regime. In the initial proposal of the Commission82, the burden of proof was
shifted, benefitting the investor. This shift was supported by the fact that the
investor generally has no insight into the internal rating procedure and there-
fore faces adamant obstacles for national liability claims.83
This proposal was not adopted.84 The claimant now has to present all neces-
sary information indicating that the credit rating agencies has committed the
specific infringement.85 Moreover, the claimant has to present detailed and
accurate information proving that the breach had an impact on the rating.
Keeping in mind that by the chosen formulation the damage claim is in prac-
tice limited to private investors, it seems to be highly unlikely that they will be
able to present any such information. Even for institutional investors, this
threshold is hard to pass.
Although the court should take into account that the investor or issuer may
not have access to all relevant information,86 the regulation leaves the general
burden of proof with the claimant. The biggest problem in damage claims, as
seen in the case of Lehman87, remains unsolved. Considering the chosen reg-
ulation on the burden of proof, the liability regime remains a theoretical claim.
However, this provision was not adopted as it was found to be inappropriate.88
Shifting the burden of proof on the credit rating agencies changes the legal
principle unilaterally towards the defendant.
82 COM (2011) 747 Recital 26.
83 Such as sec. 826 BGB and sec. 280 para. 1, 311 para. 3 sentence 2, 241 para. 2 BGB.
84 Arguing against a reversed burden of proof: Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs
for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on the proposal for a regulation
of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No. 1060/
2009 on credit rating agencies (COM (2011)0747 – C7-0420/2011 – 2011/0361 (COD)),
3. 5. 2012, p. 3.
85 Regulation 462/2013/EU art. 35 a para. 2.
86 Regulation 462/2013/EU art. 35 a para. 2.
87 He argued that “it is nearly impossible for the impaired investor to prove that the
defendant rating agency violated its duties when creating the rating since the rating
procedure lacks transparency and private investors in particular lack professional
knowledge of the matter”. Therefore, he demanded the burden of proof to be reversed,
ordering the defendant to prove the rating’s lege artis creation, Complaint, p. 5 et seq.
(Fn. 120).
88 Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs for the Committee on Economic and
Monetary Affairs on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council amending Regulation 1060/2009/EU on credit rating agencies (COM
(2011)0747 – C7-0420/2011 – 2011/0361 (COD)), 3. 5. 2012, p. 3.
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d. Loss and Causation
The regulation does not define “damage”. What constitutes it can thus be
interpreted in accordance with the applicable national law. In general, two
positions are possible: Claiming the difference in market rate (price causa-
tion)89 or reversing the investment deal90.
In the first scenario, the damages claim is based on the idea that a financial
product was either purchased too expensively when compared to a hypothet-
ical correct price or sold for what was actually too low a price.91 Bringing
forward evidence for a market rate loss is typically very difficult as it includes
the presumption that a falling market rate expresses “how wrong” a credit
rating was.92 Even though the impaired investor can involve an expert, the
expert will face problems establishing a hypothetically correct market rate,
putting the investor at a significant risk. For one, a market rate difference does
not automatically equal the rating’s degree of fault but factors many other
criteria such as market expectations. Also, it would be difficult to prove the
chronological connection of the rating and the moment of loss, as the market
rate effect of any given information is, in time, displaced by other factors.93
Alternatively, the investor can claim that the credit rating was the reason for
his investment decision. Loss is then defined as the difference between the
financial product’s actual worth after the rating and the situation the investor
would be in if he had never decided to buy. The damage claim then includes the
“negative interest”, i.e. the “damage for having made a contract”94. As evi-
dence, the investor must then bring forward facts which prove that he gen-
erally favors an investment strategy which is low in risk, arguing that a finan-
cial product with a positive rating thus fit his portfolio.95
2. Useful Extension by the European Court of Justice?
The above – mentioned criticism may partly be based on a genuinely German
interpretation of the law. In practice, the law will be interpreted independently
by the European Court of Justice (ECJ)96, i.e. from a European perspective.
89 Vasella, Haftung von Ratingagenturen, 2011, p. 370.
90 See also Bachmann, JZ 2012, 578 et seqq.
91 Vasella, Haftung von Ratingagenturen, 2011, p. 370.
92 Vasella, Haftung von Ratingagenturen, 2011, p. 371 et seqq.
93 Vasella, Haftung von Ratingagenturen, 2011, p. 372.
94 Barth, Schadensberechnung bei Haftung wegen fehlerhafter Kapitalmarktinformation,
2006, p. 195.
95 Vasella, Haftung von Ratingagenturen, 2011, p. 375.
96 ECJ, dec. of 23. 4. 1986, case no. C-294/83, (1986) ECR 1357, margin no. 23 – Les Verts.
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The ECJ might interpret the conditions for liability according to the principle
of the effet-utile. Interpreting for example European anti-trust laws, the ECJ
invented a civil liability claim emphasizing its enforceability. Additionally,
antitrust law allows estimated damage claims.97 If the ECJ transferred these
interpretations to the liability of rating regimes, this would result in a liability
relief with regards to causation and the amount of damages. Finally, it is
established in antitrust law that the claimant may use the finding of the reg-
ulatory authority for his claim.
3. Case Studies: Insufficient quality control of the CRAs
a. Australia – Rembrandt
S&P was sentenced to 20 million AU$ monetary compensation by the Federal
Court of Australia (Sydney)98 in November 2012.99 Twelve councils brought
the case against the credit rating agency after having invested in CPDOs100
which were rated AAA. During the financial crisis they lost about 90% of the
16 Mio AU$ they invested. The CPDO (so-called Rembrandt notes) were
created by ABN AMRO and rated by S&P. The Local Government Financial
Services Pty Limited (LGFS) bought these Rembrandts notes and sold them to
the councils.
The court ruled that assigning a AAA rating to an instrument implies that the
product is safe and that the rating is the result of a sound and thorough risk
assessment.101 The verdict found that the credit rating agency and the bank
97 COM (2013) 404 final.
98 Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No. 5)
[2012] FCA 1200, available at http://www.imf.com.au/pdf/Judgment%20of%20Jagot
%20J%20dated%205%20November%202012%20re_%20Local%20Government%
20Financial%20Services%20Pty%20Ltd%20%28No%205%29.pdf.
99 Battersby, Standard & Poor’s hit with $20m compensation for wonky ratings, The
Sydney Morning Herald of 6. 11. 2012, http://www.smh.com.au/business/standard–
poors-hit-with-20m-compensation-for-wonky-ratings-20121105-28u32.html, last
download 7. 3. 2014.
100 CPDOs are credit derivates, which make money through notional credit default swap
contracts (CDSs) referencing the Globoxx (i.e. CDX and iTraxx indices together; both
are indices for credit default swap contracts (CDSs).). They operate over a term of 10
years and are highly leveraged (up to 15 times). For all the details on CPDOs, see Cont/
Jessen, Constant Proportion Debt Obligation (CPDO): Modeling and Risk Analysis,
Financial Engineering Report No. 2009-01, 2. 4. 2009, available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1372414.
101 Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No. 5)
[2012] FCA 1200, margin no. 2846 (fn. 98).
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hadbeennegligentanddeceptive.The credit ratingagency awardedarating they
knew was not sound and thus mislead potential investors.102 S&P did not seek
out more information than were provided by the bank and based their risk
assessment entirelyonthis information.WhenS&P became awareof new devel-
opments such as decreased spreads, they did not initiate a new rating.103
The rating agency filed appeal; the hearing was scheduled to begin 3 March
2014.104
b. Germany – Lehman
In June 2010, an investor filed suit against S&P with the Regional Court
(Landgericht) Frankfurt/Main because of the Lehman rating. The damages
claim is 30,000 euros. The plaintiff had bought Lehman certificates which were
rated A+ by the credit rating agency. When the bank collapsed in September
2008, the certificates were rendered worthless for the investor. In court, he
claimed that Lehman’s creditability would not have been graded “good” but
“precarious” or “in danger of default” if the necessary scrutiny had been
applied. Such a negative rating would have been obligatory because there
was no sufficient amount of capital available to cover the risks. Additionally,
despite the press’s intense reporting of Lehman Brothers’ insolvency threat,
S&P held on to the “A+” grade until three days before the actual bankruptcy.
Plaintiff claimed that the credit rating agency was liable for the injury which
occurred because of its “breach of monitoring and adapting duties” according
to the principles of the contract with protective effect to the benefit of third
parties.
The plaintiff failed at first for lack of venue. In second instance, the Higher
Regional Court (OLG) Frankfurt complied with the plaintiff’s argument. This
decision was confirmed by the Federal Court of Justice (BGH). After a second
decision by the Higher Regional Court the case was remitted to the Regional
Court Frankfurt/Main. This court has not yet decided the case.
102 “misleading and deceptive conduct”, Summary of Bathurst Regional Council v Local
Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No. 5) [2012] FCA 1200, figure 53.
103 Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No. 5)
[2012] FCA 1200, margin no. 2800 (fn. 98).
104 Schneider, S&P, ABN Appeal Australian Ruling Ratings Misled Towns, March 3, 2014,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-03/s-p-abn-appeal-australian-ruling-rat
ings-misled-towns.html.
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c. USA – Settlement against S&P
In February 2013, the U.S. department of justice filed a claim against S&P
which can be considered historic.105 Subject of the dispute is the rating of
bundles of subprime mortgages and collaterized debt obligations (CDOs).
S&P allegedly assigned ratings which they knew did not reflect the true credit
risk of instruments. This behavior of credit rating agencies is “believed to have
contributed to the worst economic crisis in recent history”.106
Unfortunately, this unprecedented suit by government officials was not fol-
lowed by what would have been a landmark decision as the parties reached a
settlement. Without a judgment and thus lacking an extensive summary of the
facts, it is impossible to evaluate this case under the various legal frameworks
discussed below.
4. Liability regimes around the world
a. Liability under E.U. Law
aa. The new Art. 35a
Credit rating agencies can be held liable if they do not have “sound admin-
istrative or accounting procedures [. . .and] effective procedures for risk assess-
ment [. . .]”107. They are also obliged to “immediately assess [. . .] whether there
are grounds for re-rating or withdrawing an existing credit rating or rating
outlook”108. Furthermore, the methodologies used have to be rigorous, sys-
tematic, continuous and subject to validation”109. The rating has to be moni-
tored and reviewed at least annually.110 To ensure this monitoring, the agency
has to establish a system that monitors impacts on issued ratings by macro-
economic changes or conditions on the financial market.111 If mistakes in
rating model or in their applications occur, the credit rating agencies have to
re-rate the product.112 A credit rating agency may not issue (or if it has already
105 Neumann/Perez/Eaglesham, U.S., S&P settle in for bitter combat, The Wall Street
Journal, February 6, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873244459
04578285802822704578.html.
106 Press Release, The Department of Justice, February 5, 2013, http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2013/February/13-ag-156.html.
107 Directive 1060/2009/EC Annex III, I No. 12.
108 Directive 1060/2009/EC Annex III, I No. 21.
109 Directive 1060/2009/EC Annex III, I No. 42.
110 Directive 1060/2009/EC Annex III, I No. 46.
111 Directive 1060/2009/EC Annex III, I No. 47.
112 Directive 1060/2009/EC Annex III, I No. 49 a.
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issued, has to withdraw) a rating in case there is no reliable data or a credible
rating cannot be provided due to the complex structure or the quality of the
available information on a financial instrument.113
bb. Lehman under the new E.U. Liability Regime
In the Lehman case, the “A” rating was upheld by S&P until three days before
bankruptcy. This implied that Lehman had no financial problems or at least
was not faced with bankruptcy. Considering the massive news release about
the bankruptcy threat for Lehman114, such discrepancy between ex-post real-
ity and credit rating cannot be assigned to any subjective discretion by the
analysts in terms of detail adaption. Instead, publicly available information
was not or not correctly evaluated, the rating was not updated and investors
were not informed.
A comparable future case would result in liability according to art. 35 a in
conjunction with Annex III No. 21. According to the newly introduced pro-
vision, a credit rating agency is liable if it does not immediately assess
“whether there are grounds for re-rating or withdrawing an existing credit
rating or rating outlook”115. The broad media coverage as in the Lehman case is
without any doubt an event that demands immediate re-rating. However, two
problems remain: The plaintiff might have difficulties in proving that he rea-
sonably relied on the rating for his decision to hold onto the certificates as the
information of the impending insolvency was made publicly available in var-
ious news media116. When all other information opposes the rating, a reliance
on this rating does not seem “reasonable” and not convincing. Furthermore,
the burden of prove remains an insurmountable obstacle especially for private
investors.
113 Directive 1060/2009/EC Annex III, I No. 50.
114 see e.g. Anderson, At Lehman, Allaying Fears About Being the Next to Fall, March 18,
2008, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/18/business/18lehman.
html?versio&_r=0; Boyd, Lehman chief fells the heat, June 12, 2008, http://money.
cnn.com/2008/06/12/news/companies/lehman_management.changes.fortune/index.
htm?section=money_latest; Onaran, Lehman Drops After Fuld says Fed Eased Cash
Concerns, March 17, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=aSEbPERHCk3Q&refer=home.
115 Directive 1060/2009/EC Annex III, I No. 21.
116 Anderson, At Lehman, Allaying Fears About Being the Next to Fall, March 18, 2008,
New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/18/business/18lehman.html?
versio&_r=0; Boyd, Lehman chief fells the heat, June 12, 2008, http://money.
cnn.com/2008/06/12/news/companies/lehman_management.changes.fortune/index.
htm?section=money_latest; Onaran, Lehman Drops After Fuld says Fed Eased Cash
Concerns, March 17, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=aSEbPERHCk3Q&refer=home.
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b. Liability under German Law
aa. Intentional Damage Contrary to Public Policy
In addition to liability under the new art. 35 a, liability under German law has
to be considered, as further liability claims based on national law are not
excluded by the Regulation, art. 35 a No. 5. Under German law, a liability
for intentional damage contrary to public policy (Sec. 826 BGB) could be
considered even if the infringement was only committed negligently. Simple
negligence only requires experts to give advice not founded on sound facts or
without thorough identification of necessary information.117 The German
Federal Court of Justice (BGH) considers a behavior to be reckless if someone
strives for his own benefit without respecting the interests of others.118
bb. Lehman under German Law
For a successful damages claim under Sec. 826 BGB in the Lehman case,
plaintiffs must prove that S&P intentionally inflicted damages on them. The
defendant must have acted negligently in not promptly changing the rating
when new information was available thus intentionally causing the plaintiff’s
damages. There is no doubt that S&P acted negligently, i.e. not founding the
rating on sound facts when not considering the new information on the im-
pending insolvency. However, it will be very difficult for the plaintiff to prove
that S&P’s not changing the rating intended to inflict damages on investors. It
will also be impossible to prove that the wrong rating was the cause, legally
defined as a “condition sine qua non”, for the plaintiff’s decision to hold onto
the certificates. Plaintiff has to prove a causal link between the rating and his
decision. Considering the amount of publicly available information on the
economic situation of Lehman Brothers, the production of necessary evidence
remains doubtful.
The case would, however, appear in different light if S&P, instead of not chang-
ing the rating at all, had uprated Lehman in spite of the negative media. Such a
“new” credit rating would have signaled that S&P possessed insider knowledge
with regards to the economic situation of Lehman Brother. In this case, liability
under Sec. 826 BGB would exist because a positive credit rating against better
judgment constitutes an intentional damage contrary to public policy.119 The
117 BGH 24. 9. 1991 NJW 1991, 3282, 3283 – Bodengutachten with further references;
consenting Staudinger/Oechsler13, BGB, § 826 Rdn. 213.
118 BGH 24. 9. 1991 NJW 1991, 3282, 3283 – Bodengutachten with further references;
consenting Staudinger/Oechsler13, BGB, § 826 Rdn. 213.
119 Möllers/Leisch, in: Kölner Kommentar zum WpHG, 2nd ed. 2014, §§ 37 b, c para. 444 et
seqq.
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credit rating agency acts with intent to cause damage because they know that
investors trust in their rating and that giving a positive signal opposing other
news and information especially suggests that they have a superior knowledge.
The agencies know that under such circumstances they inflict damage on the
investors and hence act intentionally.
cc. Rembrandt under German Law
The behavior of S&P in Rembrandt constitutes an intentional damage con-
trary to public policy (Sec. 826 BGB). Credit rating agencies know that
investors trust in their risk assessment (this trust precisely is their reputa-
tional capital). When they publish a rating that is not thoroughly researched
and is not adapted to new developments, it is obvious for them that they
inflict damages on the investors. The Rembrandt notes are a financial prod-
uct that is so highly structured, packaged, repackaged and leveled that in-
vestors will not have the insight and capacity to make an own risk assess-
ment. A market for such a product is initially created by a positive rating;
with a realistic rating, Rembrandt notes would have most probably never
been bought; at least not by councils. Thus giving a too positive rating
without an own thorough risk analysis, the credit rating agency knowingly
and intentionally inflict damages.
c. Liability under English law
aa. Tort of deceit
The tort of deceit is one category of misrepresentation.120 Deceit requires an
actual “intention to cheat”121, i.e. the defendant has to know that his statement
is false or is made reckless to whether the stated facts are correct or not.122 The
plaintiff has the burden of proof for the deceptive behavior.123
Unlike wrong statements, a wrong prognosis does not constitute a breach of
law.124 A statement that is only a subjective opinion is no representation of fact
as required by torts law.125
120 Proser/Wade/Schwartz, Torts, 9th ed. 1994, p. 1013.
121 Nocton v. Ashburton, [1914] A.C. 932, 953.
122 Derry v. Peek (1889), HL 14 App. Cas. 337; Shears/Stephenson, James’ Introduction to
English Law, 13th ed. 1996, p. 258; Thomas, in: Thorne/Prentice, Butterworths Com-
pany Law Guide, 4th ed. 2002, p. 334.
123 Wallingford v. Mutual Society (1880), HL 5 App. Cas. 685.
124 Shears/Stephenson, James’ Introduction to English Law, 13th ed. 1996, p. 258.
125 Shears/Stephenson, James’ Introduction to English Law, 13th ed. 1996, p. 258.
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The “intention to cheat” was first specified by a decision by the House of
Lords in 1889 called Derry v. Peek126. The chairman of a railway company
issued a prospectus stating that the Plymouth Tramway Company had been
authorized to work (mechanical) tramways. The Board of Trade, however,
refused to consent to the use of tramways without horse powers. The chair-
men sincerely believed either that the consent had been obtained or that ob-
taining it was only a matter of formality. Consent, however, was denied.
Before the final denial, the plaintiff applied for and allotted shares in the
company, believing the statements of the prospectus. The company was
wound up due to the missing consent causing the plaintiff to lose his invested
money. The House of Lords dismissed the action because the belief of the
chairmen in obtaining the consent was not unreasonable, careless or reckless.
In the meantime, the duties of the management board regarding prospectuses
were substantially aggravated. The principle established in Derry v. Peek
remains that a false statement is not fraudulent when it is believed to be true.127
When applying these requirements on ratings, the credit rating agency could
only be held liable if they published ratings which they knew were wrong or
based on wrong facts. As long as the publishing company would believe in the
truthfulness of their ratings and this belief was not unreasonable, careless or
reckless, a claim under the tort of deceit is impossible. The main obstacle is the
burden of proof. As long as the plaintiff has to prove that the belief was care-
less or reckless, a liability claim seems to be not very promising.
aa. Tort of negligence (negligent misstatement)
Furthermore, damages in English law might be awarded for a negligently
wrong rating. The leading case concerning torts of negligence was Hedley
Byrne v. Heller & Partners Ltd128. The House of Lords clearly stated the
conditions for tortious liability regarding negligently wrong statements. Prior
to this decision, there was the consensus view that negligent wrong statements,
as opposed to fraudulent deceptions, did not justify damage claims. Damages
claims were only granted if a special (in most cases contractual) relationship
existed.129 This criterion was softened; a particular proximity between the
parties was declared sufficient for liability.
The tort of negligence has three factual requirements: First of all, the publisher
of the statement has to be able to foresee that the recipient will trust in his
126 Derry v. Peek (1889), HL 14 App. Cas. 337.
127 Shears/Stephenson, James’ Introduction to English Law, 13th ed. 1996, p. 259.
128 2 All E.R. 771.
129 Shears/Stephenson, James’ Introduction to English Law, 13th ed. 1996, p. 319; Caparo
Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2A.C. 605, 609 margin no.F, G.
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statement. There has to be a particular proximity between the two parties
though a contractual relationship is not required.130 Finally, it has to be rea-
sonable from a legal point of view to impose a special duty of care on the
publisher.
cc. Rembrandt under English Law
Liability of credit rating agencies as tort of negligence seems reasonable when
applying the above mentioned criteria on the Australian case. Every credit
rating agency can foresee (and knows) that investors trust in their ratings. The
very idea of credit ratings is based on trust.131 It remains problematic, however,
to construct a particular proximity between credit rating agencies and invest-
ors, as there is only a contract between agency and rated entity. Proximity does
not only exist where there is a contract between parties but also when the
plaintiff is part of the intended audience, which is the (potential) investors.
However, this group could be too large and undefined, leading to unlimited
and unpredictable liability. Whether or not the relationship between credit
rating agencies and (all potential) investors meets the requirements has yet to
be decided and appears very doubtful.
The same doubts rise when applying English Law to the Lehman case.
d. Liability under U.S. law
aa. Legal Framework
Basis of liability under U.S. law is Sec. 10(b) SEA read in conjunction with
Rule 10b-5 concerning material misstatements and omissions.132 Rule 10b-5
does not explicitly require intentional infringement. This lack resulted in 20
years of discussion on whether intentional or negligent behavior was covered
by the regulation.133 The question was decided by the Supreme Court in 1976
in the case of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder134. For a claim under Rule 10b-5,
plaintiff has to prove that the defendant acted with scienter. Basis of the
decision is the proximity of Rule 10b-5 to a common law fraud which requires
manipulation, deception and deliberate action.135
130 See Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2A.C. 605, 610 margin no. B.
131 Partnoy, 77 Wash.U.L.Q. (1999), 619, 627.
132 Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation, 6th ed. 2009, p. 437 et seqq.; Möllers/Rotter/
Schulte, Ad-hoc-Publizität, 2003, § 6 Rdn. 17 et seqq.
133 Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw.U.L.Rev. 562 (1972).
134 425 U.S. 185, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47 L.Ed.2d 668 (1976).
135 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 25. U.S. 185, 197, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1982, 47 L.Ed 2d 668
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Although the Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in Hochfelder and Aaron136
left the question open whether recklessness was sufficient for a damages claim,
the majority among the courts of appeal consider reckless actions sufficient for
liability.137Recklessness is defined as a “lesser form of intent [rather] than
merely a greater degree of ordinary negligence”138. Plaintiff has to prove that
the defendant could have predicted the deception of the plaintiff as a reason-
able result of his action. Whether or not he intended the deception is irrele-
vant.139
In practice, it is difficult if not impossible for the plaintiff to prove the defend-
ant’s intent. The courts may draw the conclusion that the defendant acted
recklessly from certain facts140, however, this is rarely the case. The require-
ments for assuming scienter are very high.141 For instance, a court did not draw
the conclusion of scienter where a profit of $ 1.6 million was achieved by
insider trading.142
According to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, plaintiff
has to prove that the defendant purposely violated Rule 10b-5.143 To prove that
the defendant knowingly published wrong statements, the plaintiff has to state
that the defendant had knowledge of the correct facts.144
bb. The Dodd-Frank Act
From 1980 to 2010, credit rating agencies were excluded from expert liabil-
ity145 in the United States.146 This rule was repealed by the Dodd-Frank Wall
(1976); Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation, 6th ed. 2009, p. 457; Aaron v. SEC,
446 U.S. 680, 695, 100 S.Ct. 1945, 1954, 64 L.Ed.2d 611 (1980).
136 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695, 100 S.Ct. 1945, 1954, 64 L.Ed.2d 611 (1980).
137 Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1232 (10th Cir. 1996); In re
Advanta Corp. Securities Litigation, 180 F.3d 525, 539 (3rd Cir. 1999).
138 Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977).
139 AUSA Life Insurance Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202 (2nd Cir. 2000).
140 Cox/Hillman/Langevoort, Securities Regulation, 5th ed. 2006, p. 670.
141 Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 94–95 (2nd Cir. 2000); San Leandro Emergency Med-
ical Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Phillip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 814 (2nd Cir. 1996).
142 Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 94–95 (2nd Cir. 2000).
143 In re Theragenics Corp. Securities Litigation, 137 F.Supp.2d 1339 (N.D.Ga. 2001);
Section 21D(b)(2) SEA, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2): “In any private action arising under
this chapter in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the
defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to
each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”.
144 In re First Union Corp. Securities Litigation, 128 F.Supp.2d 871 (W.D.N.C. 2001).
145 “expert liability” according to Sec. 7 and 11 Securities Act of 1933 (SA).
146 Liability exclusion, codified by Rule 436(g) SA.
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Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) in June
2010.147 Since then, credit rating agencies are subject to regular expert liability
if they agree to their ratings’ being included in issue prospectuses and appli-
cations for quotation. The new regulation requires the credit rating and the
agency’s name must be published for every issue of asset-backed securities
(ABS).148 Thus, ratings are a necessary part of listing procedure and for ABS
issue offers. In order to avoid expert liability, NRSROs149 refused to consent in
their ratings’ publication.150 Consequently, the market for asset-backed secur-
ities collapsed. The SEC reacted by issuing non-action letters151, a non-appli-
cation decree for duties of disclosure existing according to Regulation AB. The
SEC abstains from executing the duties of disclosure in the above-mentioned
cases, thus making non-rated transactions possible.152 This SEC recommen-
dation was originally in force for a limited time-frame only, but has recently
been renewed indefinitely.153 Liability rules in the U.S. therefore remain ob-
scure despite an enacted law; a clarifying statement by the SEC must be
awaited.154
Generally, credit ratings are protected as “speech” under the First Amend-
ment, practically ruling out any liability for “faulty” ratings.155 This jurispru-
dence was questioned in 2009.156 Another trial before the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Mexico157 might point in the same direction: The court
147 § 939G Dodd-Frank Act, H.R. 4173.
148 SEC, Regulation AB, Item 1120, of November 23, 2010, http://www.sec.gov/divi
sions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2010/ford072210-1120.htm.
149 Credit Rating Agencies and Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations.
150 Harper, 68 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1925, 1926, 1964.
151 For an example see the non-action letter issued to the Ford Motor Company;
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation AB, Item 1120, Nov. 23,
2010, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2010/ford072210-1120.htm.
152 Morgenson, Hey, S.E.C., That Escape Hatch Is Still Open, The New York Times,
March 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/business/06gret.html.
153 See the non-action letter issued to the Ford Motor Company; U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, Regulation AB, Item 1120, Nov. 23, 2010, http://www.sec.
gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2010/ford072210-1120.htm.
154 See Brody/Hanawalt, Dodd-Frank: Rating Agencies And The ABS Market, Law 360,
January 24, 2011, http://www.bingham.com/ExternalObjects/Docs/Dodd-Frank%20
Rating%20Agencies%20And%20The%20ABS%20Market_%286247%29.pdf; Letz-
ler, Expert liability for rating agencies, October 3, 2011, The National Law Journal,
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202517569077&slreturn=1.
155 Nagy, Credit Rating Agencies and the First Amendment: applying Constitutional
Journalistic Protection to Subprime Mortage Litigation, 94 M.L.R. 2009, 140, 142.
156 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
157 Genesee County Employees Retirement System v. Thornburg Mortgage Securities
Trust 2006-3, 825 F. Supp. 2d p. 1082, 2011 WL 5840482 (Thornburg).
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denied the defendant credit rating agencies Moody’s, S&P and Fitch to resort
to the freedom of speech because the ratings were shared only with a small
group of investors.158 In this case, according to the court, ratings do not de-
serve the broad protection given by the First Amendment making the agencies
generally liable.159 However, proving a violation of a duty of disclosure or
fraudulent behavior was only successful where S&P was concerned. The case
against Moody’s and Fitch was dismissed. The court did, however, allow the
plaintiff to amend the complaint accordingly.160 The case was settled in early
2013 for $ 11 million.161 The court missed the chance to set a trend for the
liability of credit rating agencies in the U.S. strengthening the rights of im-
paired investors.
cc. Lehman under U.S. Law
A successful claim under U.S. law would encounter problems. Currently,
credit rating agencis are excluded from expert liability due to the non-action
letters issued by the SEC. Even in case the SEC would reverse the non-action
letter, a claim will not likely be successful. The rating still is protected under
the First Amendment as “speech”. The opposite judgment of the Court for the
District New Mexico162 will not withstand a judicial examination by a higher
court. It contradicts the scope of protection intended by the First Amendment
to link the protection to the number of listeners.
Notwithstanding the foregoing concerns, even a successful claim under Rule
10b-5 would have little prospect of success. The plaintiff has to prove that the
defendant acted with intent, which is difficult if not impossible. The case
would, however, appear in different light if S&P, instead of not changing the
rating at all, had uprated Lehman in spite of the negative media. Such a be-
havior can without any doubt be seen as “scienter”, as it sends a “positive”
signal and affirms investors in their investment decision.
158 Genesee County Employees Retirement System v. Thornburg Mortgage Securities
Trust 2006-3, 825 F. Supp. 2d p. 1082, 2011 WL 5840482 (Thornburg), p. 1236.
159 Genesee County Employees Retirement System v. Thornburg Mortgage Securities
Trust 2006-3, 825 F. Supp. 2d p. 1082, 2011 WL 5840482 (Thornburg), p. 1236 et seq.
160 2011 WL 5840482, 130, 148 (Thornburg).
161 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-case.html?id=104431; Robbins, Geller Rudman
& Down LLP announcing the proposed settlement: http://www.businesswire.com/
news/home/20130104005733/en/Robbins-Geller-Rudman-Dowd-LLP-Announces-
Proposed#.UvIPqmtJnW4.
162 Genesee County Employees Retirement System v. Thornburg Mortgage Securities
Trust 2006-3, 825 F. Supp. 2d p. 1082, 2011 WL 5840482 (Thornburg).
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c. Common problems
The bottom line of all three presented rules is that the burden of proof remains
the most critical point especially concerning the intent of the credit rating
agency. Reversal of the burden of proof is considered the solution. It is difficult
for the investor to prove that he relied on the rating, but it is just as difficult for
the credit rating agencies to produce evidence. They will have problems prov-
ing that an investor did not rely on a rating. The same applies for the proof of
the intent of the agency: the investor cannot prove the intent of the agency, as it
is an interior position. But for the agency, it is impossible to prove having no
intent.
Still the liability regime as it is today is not effectively offering legal protection.
The regulation adopted falls short of the original Commission’s proposal
especially with regard to the burden of proof and the requirement of “reason-
able reliance” excluding all institutional investors.
5. Is Liability the solution?
It is the hope and aim of the new liability regime to ensure a better quality of
ratings and protect investors and issuers. But perhaps a liability is not the
solution for the main problem existing when it comes to rating. One of the
main aims of the European Union is emphasized in the most recent Regula-
tions: the reliance of the market on ratings in general should be reduced. This
aim might even be undermined by the new liability regime.
It is undisputed that credit rating agencies played a role in the financial crisis. It
remains mysterious why investors trusted in ratings. While the informational
value of ratings declined, dependency grew. The reason for this could be the
growing amount of references made to rating in laws and directives. At the
same time, investors started to use ratings instead of own risk analysis. The
combination of these two factors leads to a climate where the trust in ratings
was bigger than the informational value the rating generated. The financial
industry forgot that ratings are always a prediction of a future development
which cannot, as is the nature of the future itself, be foreseen or predicted.
Every attempt to predict the future is usually based on experiences from the
past thus making it impossible to predict developments that have not been
there before such as the most recent financial crisis.
Every reference to credit ratings in rules and regulations gives (too) much
authority to these ratings. Hence it can be argued that abolishing these refer-
ences is a first step in breaking the power of the credit rating agencies. Intro-
ducing a civil liability regime at the same time as abolishing the references in
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regulation is diametrically opposed to this goal. A liability regime suggests
that ratings can be trusted with making correct predictions on how a financial
instrument will perform in the future. This has been proven wrong not only
during the financial crisis.
The final goal in regulating credit rating agencies should be conveying the
message that ratings are only one opinion on how a financial instrument might
perform in future and does not replace an own risk assessment. Furthermore,
every market participant should be aware that predicting the future is impos-
sible for everyone and there is always a risk left. One way to achieve this could
be a waiver of any reference to ratings in laws and regulations including a
liability regime.
IV. Conclusion
a. Breaking the Oligopoly
Still, dependency on the leading agencies’ ratings is too high. The Commis-
sion’s proposal to require two ratings is positive. However, it does not suffice
as can be seen in the newest developments of Roland Berger’s European credit
rating agency.163 Even today, potential investors seem doubtful about the
agency’s future acceptance on the market. The political players want more
competition but consider it “a question for market participants, not the gov-
ernment”164. For the given reasons, the legislator refrains from direct interfer-
ence with the rating system but does not see alternatives to creating a govern-
ment-run European credit rating agency. Legally requiring a (second)
European rating could “kill two birds with one stone”. Not only would it
break the market’s oligopolistic structure, the legislature could also give a
necessary jump-start to small European or new rating agencies such as Roland
Berger. The legislature could help the European agencies to gain access to the
credit rating market and at the same time improve competition and, conse-
quently, quality.
b. Liability de lege ferenda
The introduction of a liability regime as such has to be appreciated and is a
great step forward. It may be difficult for investors to claim damages, but
credit rating agencies will have to fear consequences as gross transgressions
163 Europäische Ratingagentur von Roland Berger auf der Kippe, FTD, April 16, 2012.
164 Kotthaus, Speaker of the German Minister of Finance, FAZ, April 16, 2012, p. 11.
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will result into a liability under art. 35a. In addition, national liability regime
offer impaired investors a further possibility for compensation. However,
some factual requirements have to be changed. Infringements of the require-
ments of Annex III lead only to damages if they have affected the rating. The
investor has to prove this effect which will hardly be possible. This could
easily be remedied by introducing the assumption that every breach of Annex
III duties affects the rating unless the credit rating agency can prove otherwise.
The credit rating agencies know that their ratings are relevant for market
participants. Thus it seems plausible too relieve the requirements for causation
and damage. Both could easily be achieved by a reversal of proof as initially
proposed by the Commission.165
165 COM (2011) 747 Recital 26.
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